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The relationship between money (usually the daily wage for qualified male 
workers, though this is not normally stated explicitly) and foodstuffs (usually 
grain) has long been the starting point and basis for assessment in attempts 
to establish the income and living conditions of broad sectors of the population 
in the late medieval towns. In the following article, this relationship will be 
examined in a large town at the end of the Middle Ages-Nuremberg in the 
years between 1470 and 1510.’ My use of the term ‘relationship’ rather than 
‘prices’ or ‘purchasing power’ is deliberate. The intention is not to investigate 
long-term trends, changes in monetary values, and late medieval ‘market 
baskets’, but rather to provide a ‘snapshot’ of the conditions in which the 
foodstuffs required for daily life were purchased in a large town in the late 
Middle Ages, and thus of the real prices facing the inhabitants of Nuremberg- 
or at least the majority of them-at the end of the fifteenth century. I will 
attempt to show that the relationship between bread and money can be only 
imperfectly illustrated by the curve of bread prices. In reality, if we are honest, 
it is very difficult to link the changes in the price of grain in Nuremberg’ 
between 1470 and 1510 to the real living conditions of the town’s poor. How 
can the history of prices be expressed in a way which also does justice to the 
position of the consumers? 
’ This article was written in conjunction with a larger study of the economic practices of the 
lower classes in the towns of the late Middle Ages: V. Groebner, Okonomie ohne Haus. Zum 
Wirtschaften armer Leute in Niirnberg am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts (Gdttingen 1993). 
* An excellent survey of rye prices in Nuremberg, and a corrective to incorrect and incomplete 
older figures, is provided by W. Bauernfeind, ‘Brotgetreidepreise in Niirnberg 1427-1538’, in 
Niirnberg und Bern. Zwei Reichsstadte und ihre Landgebiete (Erlangen, 1990). pp, 16!3-225 
(=Erlanger Forschungen 46). 
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I 
Wilhelm Abel’s classic comparison of artisan wages and grain prices in the 
fifteenth century, seen as evidence of a ‘golden age of wage labour’, has been 
increasingly criticized and his findings of a ‘comfortable life’ and cheap basic 
foodstuffs in the towns of the late Middle Ages subjected to thorough revi~ion.~ 
However, the customary method of investigating living standards and devel- 
opments in the purchasing power of income from wage labour has remained: 
the comparison of the daily wage of an artisan (male, according to the 
unspoken assumption that this is ‘representative’) with its equivalent in grain. 
According to a recent analysis, for example, a journeyman in the Nuremberg 
building trade would have been able to buy 13.7 kg of rye with his daily wage 
in 1470, 14.2 kg in 1475, and 9.5 kg in 1495.4 
Could he really do so? Even though the author of this calculation draws 
attention to ‘possible elements of great uncertainty’, his figures miss the point 
in several respects. Broad annual averages tend to obscure the short-term 
fluctuations of ‘rye purchasing power’ and provide a more constant picture 
than was in fact the case. More important, however, is the fact that a 
Nuremberg building worker did not obtain unprocessed rye for his meals, but 
purchased it in the form of bread. At least in the minds of the people, bread 
was the main source of nutrition; at times of price increases, the attention of 
the authorities was also directed chiefly towards bread. Recent researchers 
have calculated how greatly the price of bread in late medieval towns was 
inflated by sales margins, losses of mills, millers’ and bakers’ profits, and 
municipal consumer taxes. Depending on the type (cheap dark or more 
expensive white bread), bread was between 40 and 80 per cent more expensive 
than the supposed measure of purchasing power, rye grain.’ Moreover, the 
history of prices has revealed a strange phenomenon, which has been known 
for some time: grain prices in the late Middle Ages either did not respond at 
all to depreciations in the value of money, however drastic, or they did so 
only belatedly and to a limited extent. In late medieval Nuremberg, grain was 
traded almost exclusively in silver money, in Pfennige;6 the value of the 
’ See e.g. U. Dirlmeier, Untersuchungen zu Einkornmensverhaltnien und Lebenshal- 
tungskosten in oberdeutschen Stadten des Spatmittelalters (Heidelberg, 1978); and recently E. 
Schubert, Einfuhrung in die Grundprobleme der deutschen Geschichte des Spatmittelalters (Darm- 
stadt, 1992). 
P. Fleischmann, Das Bauhandwerk in Nurnberg vom 14. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert (Nurem- 
berg, 1985), pp. 177 f. 
U. Dirlmeier, ‘Zum Problem von Versorgung und Verbrauch privater Haushalte im Spat- 
rnittelalter’, in A. Haverkamp (ed.), Haus und Familie in der spatmittelalterlichen Stadt (Cologne/ 
Vienna, 1984), pp. 257-88, here p. 281. 
The municipal guide prices for rye were always in silver money; also, in the buying and 
selling of grain in the municipal court books, the price for the dry measure of rye was always 
given in Pfund/Pfennige. The only (and probably significant) exceptions were the crisis maximum 
prices in the inflationary crises of 1482-3 and 1502-3, which were noted by the contemporary 
chroniclers in Gulden. See e.g. K.  Hegel (ed.), Die Chroniken der deurschen Sradten vom 14. b b  
ins 16. Jahrhunderte (hereafter cited as Chroniken), vol. 11 (Leipzig, 1872), pp. 368, 634 f .  
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Nuremberg Pfennige as against the more stable Gulden fell continuously in 
the second half of the fifteenth century.’ Why did the price of the dry measure 
of grain not rise when the money for which it was sold contained less and less 
silver? There is an obvious explanation which has already been advanced by 
earlier economic historians and has been made even more plausible by research 
in the last few years: it was the shortage of money which kept prices down. 
In his investigation of journeymen and and wage labourers in the Upper 
Rhine, Knut Schulz observed that in the towns of the late fifteenth century, 
the increase in the supply of money lagged behind demand. Debased coins 
thus failed to unleash price increases or inflationary tendencies, particularly 
as the population accepted the devalued money (while in the relatively 
coin-rich sixteenth century comparatively small debasements of the coinage 
triggered an explosive rise in prices).8 This appears strange to us, since for us 
the price of an item is a self-evident and more or less universal indicator of 
its scarcity or its value. In late medieval Nuremberg, however, grain and silver 
money were, in a way, equal; both were goods available only in limited 
amounts and were occasionally scarce, and the price of grain simply gives 
their actual exchange relationship. 
If we wish to assess the purchasing power of the daily wage of late medieval 
wage labourers, we cannot use grain in wholesale trade quantities (and at 
wholesale prices) as our indicator. Even in normal years there were con- 
siderable seasonal fluctuations in grain prices. The recipients of small incomes 
were not in a position to lay in significant stores of bread grain in the months 
following the harvest, when the price was usually much lower. Throughout 
the year they remained dependent on the movements in the market price for 
more expensive bread.9 Because they were purchasing for short periods, they 
were forced to follow every fluctuation in the price of grain during the year 
between harvests; for that reason, they paid considerably more on average 
for their bread than their wealthier fellow citizens, who were able to lay in a 
year’s supply of cheap September grain and have it made into bread by wage- 
bakers as required.” There was thus a clear social differentiation in the grain 
price. The various different price levels which existed cannot be equated one 
with another or blended together: first, the wholesale prices with their monthly 
fluctuations, the rate at which the Heilig-Geist-Spitul, for example, would buy 
’ H. Eichhorn, Der Strukturwandel im Geldumlauf Frankens zwischen 1437 und 1610 (Wies- 
baden, 1973), p. 225; see also E.  Scholler, Das Miinzwesen der Reichsstadt Niirnberg im 16. 
Jahrhundert (PhD Erlangen, 1912). 
K.  Schulz, Handwerksgesellen und Lohnarbeiter. Untersuchungen zur oberrheinischen und 
oberdeutschen Sradtgeschichte des 14. bis 17. Jahrhunderts (Sigmaringen, 1985), p. 324. 
See Chroniken, ii. 299 (official register of corn stocks in the city 1449); Dirlmeier, Unter- 
suchungen, p. 51; id., ‘Versorgung’, pp. 267 f .  See also H. Hofmann, Die Getreidehandehpolirik 
der Reichsstadt Niirnberg, insbesondere uom 13. bis rum 16. Jahrhundert (Nuremberg, 1912). p. 
52. 
lo On seasonal prices in Nuremberg, see Bauernfeind, ‘Brotgetreidepreise’, pp. 207 f . ;  also 
C.-M. de la Roncitre, Prix et salaires d Florence au X N e  sikcle (Rome, 1982), pp. 71 f .  
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its grain and which provided the official guide prices of the wholesale trade, 
the raittung, in the council books and records from 1489; second, the specu- 
lative peak prices which emerged in the years of price increases and which 
the chroniclers noted with striking frequency in gold; and third, the price of 
bread, burdened as it was with various extra costs and profit margins (and 
from 1504 with the municipal consumer tax on grain). Clearly it is only the 
last of these price levels-that which relates to bread-which can be compared 
with the income earned in the daily wage of artisans. 
In November 1442 the Nuremberg council ordered that light wheat-mixed 
bread and rye bread, which was on sale in the town for one Huller (the smallest 
silver coin), should be bought secretly from twenty-eight of the town's bakers 
and its weight investigated. The result was alarming: the councillors entrusted 
with the task reported that 'die pecken die hallerwert prot vast clein und 
ungeleich ein uil grosser dann der andere packen' ('the bakers are baking the 
one-haller bread too small and some are baking it much bigger than others'). 
In fact, the weight of the bread varied significantly. From the baker Jung 
Ofner, for example, two Huller would purchase two loaves of white bread 
weighing 345.14 g, but from the baker Vogel the loaves weighed only 263.5 g. 
The variations in the cheaper rye bread were even greater: for two Huller the 
baker Wolfflein sold rye bread weighing 627.2 g, but for the same price the 
bread sold by the baker Vogel weighed only 523.3 g-14 per cent less. The 
amount of bread received for one Huller obviously depended on the baker 
from whom it was bought.'' 
These inquiries formed part of the preliminary work of the council for a 
revision of the Brotordnung following the price-rise crises of 14324 and 1437- 
9. The new regulation came into force in October 1443: its core was a table 
of bread weight, the raitungspene, which fixed the weight of a loaf of bread 
worth one Pfennig depending on the current price of the Siimer (the Nur- 
emberg dry measure, around 318 litres) of rye. In late medieval towns this 
was normal practice. The price of the bread remained the same, at 1 Pfennig 
( d ) ,  according to the Nuremberg table. If the Siimer price rose, the bread 
became not dearer, but smaller and lighter; if the price fell, the loaves 
were made bigger and heavier. The flexible element, which expressed the 
relationship between commodity and money, was not the price of the bread 
but its weight. Some other foodstuffs which were subject to similar seasonal 
fluctuations in price were sold in the same way: at a fixed price but in varying 
quantity. It was a practice which went hand in hand with the lack of divisional 
coins and the scarce supply of money.12 
In order to discover the purchasing power of daily wages in terms of the 
actual food they could buy, it is necessary to convert the Nuremberg rye 
prices, with the aid of the municipal table, into the corresponding weight of 
I' Stadtarchiv Nurnberg, A22, Amb. 31, f ,  51r-53r. 
I' Eggs are frequently cited as an example. See Schulz, Hundwerksgesellen, p. 423; similarly 
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bread which could be purchased for one Pfennig.13 An account of the bread 
weight enables us to obtain a more accurate idea of actual conditions because 
it turns on the relationship between the two scarce commodities of bread and 
small coin. Such a result comes much closer to the experiences and con- 
sumption practices of the inhabitants of Nuremberg than the usual index 
calculations. How many grams of bread was the Pfennig worth? 
I1 
Such an account of the weight of bread in Nuremberg between 1470 and 
1510 certainly helps to illuminate the clear short-term changes in the bread- 
purchasing power of the local silver money, yet it gives no more than a partial 
description of actual conditions. There are two reasons for this. 
First, it is restricted only to the cheapest kind of bread, the relatively coarse 
rye bread, which was baked hard and dark. Perhaps in order to make it keep 
longer, it was apparently supposed to be baked as dry and hard as possible. 
The bread baked in 1449 under the auspices of the municipal authorities was 
particularly praised for its firmnes~,‘~ and in his account of the municipal 
baking of 1501-3, Anton Tucher declared that the bread was coarser than was 
customary and was also kept for eight days before being distributed-‘das hat 
auch wol er~prossen’.’~ Other contemporary voices were less happy with the 
hard, coarse rye bread. The Nuremberg artisan poet Hans Rosenpliit told the 
mocking tale of a mean and lazy baker who fed his journeymen badly with 
‘hert kej? und grob prot’;I6 in 1490 Kunz Has, in his poem in praise of 
Nuremberg, reserved particular praise for its tight controls on the bakers:” 
‘wie sy die laib sollen machenlein rechte grosse und nit zegrob. Sollich regiment 
ich billich lob.’ 
According to Has, the bread should not be baked too coarsely-in the case 
of bread, as with other foodstuffs, there was a clear and fairly drastic social 
differentiation. The lighter and finer the bread, the better and healthier it was 
regarded as being. The Nuremberg Stadtarzt Dr Johannes Lochner, who in 
1480 collected medical advice for his son on ways to keep healthy while 
travelling, regarded dark rye bread as completely indigestible and demanded 
that bread should be made from pure wheat flour. It should also be white in 
colour and sweet to taste and should be a day old at most; the coarse crusts 
should be removed before it was eaten.” As well as being a particular taste, 
Staatsarchiv Niirnberg, Rep. 60 b. Ratsbucher (hereafter abbreviated to RB), 2, f. 279r (1479). 
l3 See, in detail, Groebner, Okonomie p. 82. 
I s  Chroniken ii. 305 (1449) and xi. 635 (1503). 
l6 Printed in K. Euling, Das Priamel bis Hans Rosenpliit (Breslau, 1905). pp. 557 f .  
” K. A.  Barack (ed.), Ein Lobgedicht auf Niirnberg aus dem Jahre 1490 uon dem Meister- 
I* H. J.  Vermeer (ed.), ‘Johannes Lochners “Reiseconsilia” ’, in Sudhoffs Archiu. Zeiischrifr 
Stadtarchiv Niirnberg, A22, Amb. 31, f. 67r. 
Siinger Kuntz Has (Nuremberg, 1858), p. 25. 
fur Wissenrchafisgeschichte 56 (1972), 145-96, here pp. 159 f .  
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this was also a rather expensive one, since in Nuremberg this kind of white 
bread, light and finely sieved, known as semef and usually baked with two- 
thirds wheat and one-third spelt with the husks removed, was comparatively 
dear. We have already seen that in 1442 it was possible to buy only about half 
as much white bread as rye bread for one Pfennig (=2 Hafler).I9 At the end 
of the fifteenth century, however, white bread appears repeatedly in books 
of accounts, food regulations, and bills for food, showing that it had become 
part of the regular food of Nuremberg wage labourers. The weight table of 
1443 relates to rye bread alone, a sort of smallest common denominator of 
the daily menu. 
The second restriction on the validity of the bread-weight curve rests on a 
more fundamental problem-the gulf between late medieval norms and actual 
conditions. The Nuremberg Brotordnung of 1443 laid down that the bakers 
had to manufacture their bread according to the prescribed weight; only 
loaves baked to a weight equivalent to one, two, four, or six Pfennige were 
permitted.20 All other bread weights were illegal, and for bakers who fell 
below the bread weights the police regulations and the rules controlling bakers 
in the Ratsoerliissen established penalties which included fines, imprisonment, 
and the temporary closure of businesses. In their panegyrics to Nuremberg in 
1490, Konrad Celtis and Kunz Has both stress the tight municipal controls on 
the bakers in the form of an extensive system to control the weight and quality 
of the bread sold within the town.21 Alongside a committee of specially sworn- 
in master bakers (the only permitted institution of craft self-administration: 
guilds were forbidden in Nuremberg) there were a number of special municipal 
officials, chief among them the bailiff (Pfunder), who was responsible for the 
observation of the craft and police regulations. Subordinate to him were the 
market guards (Marktmeister) and a number of lower officials including the 
controllers in plain clothes, ‘des pfenters heimliche knechte’. Judging by the 
wording of their ordinances, the Nuremberg authorities exerted strict and 
extensive craft supervision. In view of the ‘strict controls on price and quality’, 
earlier researchers have considered that the council exercised ‘patriarchal 
care’; the municipal controls on commodities were believed to show ‘all the 
marks of welfare relief and brought good results’. From their examination of 
the municipal apparatus of control and ordinance-making, other researchers 
have even concluded that ‘in view of the strict quality controls and fixed prices 
l9 See also Dirlmeier, ‘Versorgung’, p. 283. 
Stadtarchiv Numberg, A22, Amb. 31, f .  54v. White bread was also sold in loaves at one 
Huller. 
21 See Hofmann, Gerreidehandelspolitik, p. 21; A. Jegel, ‘Die Ernahrungsfursorge des Alt- 
Nurnberger Rates’, Minedungen des Vereinr fur die Geschichte Niirnbergs (hereafter abbreviated 
to MVGN) 37 (1940), 37-199, here p. 57; on Celtis and Has see A. Werminghoff, Konrad Ceftis 
und sein Buch iiber Niirnberg (Freiburg irn Breisgau, 1921), pp. 167-71; also Barack, Has, pp. 
25 f .  
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for foodstuffs imposed by the council, life in Nuremberg at the end of the 
Middle Ages was cheap’.’’ 
The council records in the late fifteenth century actually dealt strikingly 
often with the issues of bread weight and controls on bakers. On numerous 
occasions the council felt compelled to exhort the bakers to bake smaller 
loaves for one Pfennig as well as the larger loaves. In 1457 it was stipulated 
that the bakers should continue to make small loaves so that the poor could 
buy food for themselves at market; similar ordinances were issued on several 
occasions at the beginning of the 1480~.’~ Even more frequent were reminders 
to the bailiff to work with the sworn master bakers in order to ensure the 
observation of the Brotordnung and of bread weights. In 1477, 1478, 1480, 
and 1491 the bakers as a body were reprimanded for making their bread too 
small and inadequate. Then, in 1492, the council decided to remind them 
‘ernstlich’ to bake their breads according to the prescribed weight: they were 
warned not to give the council cause to examine the weight of the bread they 
sold-‘to get out the scales again’, as the protocol put it.24 Apparently normal 
controls did not involve checking the weight, showing that the authorities 
took an elastic approach to their own rules. In 1481 the bakers were assured 
that baking white bread up to 2 lot, and rye bread up to 3 lot, below 
the prescribed weight would in future go unpunished. Deviations from the 
prescribed weight which the council regarded as ‘ungeuerlich’ were as high as 
20 per cent for white bread and 16 per cent for rye bread; the bakers could 
thus bake their bread either one-fifth or one-sixth lighter than the official 
weight without p~nishment!’~ In May 1482, when the price for the Siimer of 
rye had risen considerably in a period of price increases, the council relaxed 
the regulations still further. Similarly, during the price rises of 1491-2 the 
bailiff was ordered to be lenient in controlling the bread weight .% A certain- 
not inconsiderable-failure to meet the bread weight was tolerated by the 
authorities. 
However, the council did not only issue warnings and exhortations. In 1476 
the bakers Baireutter, Schnittner, Krantz, and Koburger were sentenced to 
See Hofmann, Getreidehandelspolitik, pp. 10-12, 21, 79; Jegel, ‘Ernahrungsfiirsorge’, pp. 
83-7 and 11; quoted in H. Weiss, Lebenshaltung und Vermogensbildung des ‘mittleren’ 
Burgerrums. Studien zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Reichsstadt Nurnberg zwischen 
1400 und 1600 (Munich, 1981), p. 81. 
RB lb,  f .  312r (1457). At Easter 1482 the bakers were forbidden to sell white bread for 1 
Pfennig and were told to continue offering the light bread at 1 Huller; at the beginning of May 
1482 they were given permission to do so, but were told that they must always offer hallersemel 
for the poor at the same time: StaatsAN Rep. ma,  Ratsverlasse 143, f. l r  and 19r (hereafter 
abbreviated to RV). Similarly RB 3, f. 183v and RB 5, f.299r-an indication that the poor also 
ate white bread. 
24 RB 2, f .  178r (1477); RB 97, f. 25v (1478); RV 118, f .  7v (1480); RV251, f. 12r (1490); RB 
5, f .  229v (1492). 
RV 136, f. 9r (1481). See Stadt AN A 22, Amb. 31, f. 51v; Bauernfeind, Brotgetreidepreise, 
p. 213. 
RB 3, f .  183v (1482); Jegel. ‘Emahrungsfiirsorge’, p. 83 (1492-3). 
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fourteen days and nights in prison and to temporary closure of their businesses 
for baking their loaves much too small. In 1481 the bakers Hans Baireutter 
and Class Furmann were punished with four days’ imprisonment in the tower 
and temporary closure for the same reason.27 In July of the same year the 
bakers were forbidden to pay off in money the terms of imprisonment imposed 
on them; they were prevented from letting other bakers sell bread in their 
shops during their arrest and the temporary closure of their business; and they 
were not allowed to pay a fine in place of the temporary closures. Apparently 
the decree failed to have the desired effect, since in November 1481 it was 
again announced that bakers who violated the bread regulations were to be 
sent to prison as well as having their businesses temporarily closed; these 
punishments would have to be served and could not be converted into 
fines.28 However, an entry in the Ratsuerlasse of 1490 reveals rather different 
treatment of Contz Koburger, a wealthy master baker and member of the 
Grosserer Rat. According to the protocol, he was to be punished according 
to the law for baking his loaves too small, but his term of imprisonment was 
to be ‘forgotten’. Another instance of lenient applications of the laws can be 
found on the next page of the same protocol, with more bakers having their 
terms of imprisonment in the tower converted to house arrest. In July 1492 
the council let Contz Koburger off altogether after another violation of the 
B r o t ~ r d n u n g . ~ ~  However, two years later the same council responded with 
irritation to an application from the sworn masters of the bakers’ trade, 
requesting mercy for a colleague who had committed an offence. According 
to the protocol they were to be given a streflich red because they had asked 
for a remission of punishment, which was against municipal laws.w Only the 
council had the right to grant remission of punishment or pardons. Such 
remissions were not rare but in most cases they were made in secret-‘in 
geheym’. They could, therefore, not be demanded openly. This, it would 
seem, was the faux pas for which the master bakers were being ~eprimanded.~’ 
The Ratsuerliisse in the council protocols and council books were not 
concerned solely with particular or major violations of the regulations, but 
also attempted to push through new rules when conditions changed. Smaller 
or ‘normal’ infringements of the bread regulations, on the other hand, were 
not the concern of the council but of the officials appointed for the purpose, 
and it is in their records that details can be found. The accounts of the bailiff, 
27 RB 2, f. 66v (1476); RB 3, f .  136v (1481). 
RB 3, f. 99r and 144r. Terms of imprisonment could otherwise usually be converted into 
fines according to a fixed tariff. On the issue of new regulations in October 1487, see RB 4, f .  
273. 
RV 256, ff. 14r and 14v (1490); RB 5, f .  225r (1492). 
RB 6, f. 72v. 
31 In other cases there was pro forma payment of a fine: for an unnamed offence in 1492 Kraws 
Schmid was sentenced to pay a fine ‘nach lawf des geserzes’ according to the council protocol: 
‘und er so das uberantwurt, im das widerzugeben, bi@ an eynen gulden,’ RB 5 ,  f .  226r; similarly 
RV 237, f .  12v (1489). Not all the fines imposed, therefore, were actually paid. 
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the head of the municipal executive, can be found at irregular intervals from 
1477 onwards in the inventory of the Stadtrechnungsbelege of the Staatsarchiv 
Nurnberg. The bailiff collected fines for breaches of the peace, for exceeding 
maximum prices, and for violation of the laws on the market and the coinage. 
His accounts listed the amount of the fine, in most (but not all) cases the 
name of the offender, rather less often his trade and the nature of his offence. 
The register of fines thus has a number of important gaps: there are long 
periods for which no records exist; the offence is cited in only about one-third 
of the entries; and only in about half of the cases did the bailiff note 
the occupation of the culprit.32 Nevertheless, these accounts provide an 
informative sample by which to gauge the frequency of violations. On 24 
October 1482, for example, the bailiff entered no fewer than 3,000 d in fines 
from bakers for baking their loaves too small. Of the thirteen surviving bailiffs 
slips dating from the year 1483, eight cite fines for that same offence; of the 
eleven surviving slips from 1484, no fewer than nine refer to fines on bakers. 
In November 1487 the bailiff collected 400 d in fines for making their loaves 
too small from each of the bakers 'Ulrich peck bey sant Jacob', Kornschreiber 
of the Heilig-Geist-Spiral, and thirteen others.33 
If something approaching an overall picture emerges from the Ratsuerliissen 
and the accounts of fines, it is marked by the constant presence of cheating 
in business practices and of failure to keep to the required bread weights.34 
There is no doubt that bread baked below the required weight was part of 
the reality of life for buyers in Nuremberg at the end of the fifteenth century. 
In other words, a certain degree of cheating by the bakers was normal. Though 
the values of the bread-weight curve offer some clues about the fluctuations 
in the bread-purchasing power of the Nuremberg Pfennig, they cannot there- 
fore be regarded as hard data. 
It was not only the bakers who cheated. In the literature of the fifteenth 
century there are frequent complaints about unspeakable practices in the 
foodstuffs business in general. Popular Nuremberg artisan poetry offers a 
vivid picture of everyday cheating and over-charging. In a work dating from 
the middle of the century, Hans Rosenplut claims that 'die pirprew eilf jar 
pirprewn, gebenlzehen jar rus, hopf und wasser darneben' and in one popular 
and ironic epigrammatic poem lists a number of comic and improbable figures: 
the innkeeper who never swindles his guest, the merchant who always tells 
32 In some years the accounts are plentiful, in others they are lacking altogether. The first (far 
from complete) is dated 1477; the last which is relevant to our period comes from January 1500. 
During the 24 years in between, bailiff's slips have survived from 14 accounting years: StaatsAN 
Re 
'"Ibid: I 111  (1482). I 157 (1483), I 187 (1484) and I279 (1487). 
34 A number of bakers punished for making their loaves too small later appear as members 
of the supervisory committee of geschworen rnaister, e.g. Hans Baireutter and Jorg Hertl: 
Amterbiicher Staatsarchiv Numberg Rep. 62, Nr. 12, f .  l l r  (1489) and Nr. 13, f. 13r (1490). 
54a I ,  63, 1 1 1 ,  157, 187, 200, 260. 279, 368, 381, 471, 500, 657. 
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the truth, and the shopkeeper who never cheats his customers.35 In a panegyric 
to Nuremberg printed in 1490, Kunz Has gives details of the tight municipal 
controls on goods and the strict punishments for swindlers; he has special 
praise for the council’s close supervision of the butchers, which prevented 
people from being cheated with inferior cuts or meat from mangy animals. 
Sebastian Brant also credited the butchers with special skills at cheating: one 
section of his Nurrenschiff is called ‘Vun fulsch und beschifi’ and describes in 
malicious detail how the butchers in the market manipulate their weights and 
measures: 
und frogen eyns/wie vil man heysch 
den taumen wigt man zu demm fley~ch.~’  
Weights and measures were also manipulated in the sale of other foodstuffs. 
Every year on Margarete (13 July), all the pots and measures used by the 
innkeepers and dealers in foodstuffs were supposed to be examined by 
the council. This examination was apparently insufficient, and the council 
employed secret controllers and informers in addition to the bailiff.37 In fact, 
each of the surviving punishment registers of the city accounts contains details 
of fines imposed for the manipulation of weights. One list of March 1476 gives 
the names of forty-three people who were punished for using false weights 
and measweewi th  fines of 8,420 d overall.3R According to the city accounts, 
in 1482 the butcher Ulein NeuS alone paid no less than 600d in fines for 
cheating with his weights; four of his fellow-butchers had to pay fines of 
between 250 and 600 d for false weighing of meat. In May of the same year 
Neua appears in the bailiff’s accounts with an additional fine for furkuufs of 
meat, while his wife was fined another 180 d because of scales which had been 
the subject of complaint.39 
Punishments for exceeding the maximum prices were mentioned even more 
frequently, especially for meat. Of the twenty-three bailiff‘s slips surviving 
from 1482 and 1483, fourteen list fines because of lflaisch hiiher gebens’; in 
total during this period, sixty people-not including the bakers-were forced 
to pay fines for exceeding the maximum prices, for fiirkuuf of foodstuffs, or 
for cheating with the weights. The bailiff‘s slips for the 1490s, fewer of which 
have survived, do not show any significant reduction in these offences. The 
latest from the period under investigation, the bailiffs accounts slip for 
January 1500, contains no fewer than eight punishments for butchers; for 
selling sausages too dear, for keeping back goods, and for exceeding the 
maximum prices. This last offence alone was punished on five occasions, once 
35 K. Euling (ed.), Hundert noch ungedruckte Priameln des 15. Jahrhunderts (Paderborn/ 
Barack, Has, p. 24; S .  Brant, Das Narrenschiff. Nachdruck nach der Erstausgabe oon 1494 
37 Staatsarchiv Niirnberg, Rep. 52b, Nr. 231, f .  332r-r; Jegel, ‘Ernahrungsfiirsorge’, p. 110. 
38 Staatsarchiv Niirnberg, Rep. 54a, I 13. 
r, Ibid., Rep. 54, Nr. 18: f.  18r, f .  12r; Rep. 54a, I 1 1 1 .  
Miinster 1887), p. 85; Euling, ‘Das Priarnel’, pp. 547 f .  
(Tiibingen, 1968), p. 270. 
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with a fine of 300d and four times with a fine of 600d40 All this must be 
assessed against a background in which the offence and the offenders were 
named in only a small number of cases; the number of fines actually imposed 
for these offences was probably much higher. As in the case of the bakers, 
the accounts of fines provide details of no more than a section or sample of 
the offences. Nevertheless, certain butchers are cited in them so frequently 
that we can assume that the punishment registers reflect general and everyday 
business  practice^.^' 
I11 
Late medieval Nuremberg, with its cheating bakers and butchers, was not an 
isolated case. Long lists of punishments for exceeding the maximum prices 
and for inaccurate weights and measures appear in many of the surviving 
court sources of the late Middle Ages. This fact has led Gerhard Jaritz to call 
for ‘greater evaluation and critical analysis’ of such sources and to produce 
his own investigation of craftsmen’s cheating in the late medieval period ,42 
though without opening up any new methodological approach to the problem. 
is the only solution open to us to agree with the pithy but helpless comment 
of the Strasbourg shopkeepers’ regulation of 1471 to the effect that there was 
‘oil beschisses’ being done?43 
As a first step it is essential to examine conditions in the Nuremberg markets 
more closely. The fluctuations in the price of grain and in bread weight have 
already been mentioned, but the price of meat was subject to much less 
dramatic variation. in the decades between 1470 and 1510, according to the 
recommended price, buyers paid between 3 and 5d per pound for ox meat (of 
good quality)44-these were stable conditions by comparison with those of 
bread, wine, or fat. As in the case of bread, however, these lists of maximum 
prices fixed by the authorities do not tell the whole story. Not only the 
recommended prices but also other regulations of the Nuremberg butchers’ 
regulations (Flelschhackerordnung) were, it appears, continually violated. 
Specific practices such as price-raising agreements, the granting of preferential 
treatment to rich masters in the annual drawing of lots for the butchers’ stalls, 
and the sale of diseased meat, were the order of the day. Can this be dismissed 
4u Ibid., 1657. 
4’ The butcher Ott Kraws, for example, paid a fine of 250 d for exceeding the maximum price 
in August 1478, 600 d in Aug. 1482, and 600 d on two occasions in 1483; in Feb. 1484 his wife 
was fined 600 d for cheating her customers with the weighing. Staatsarchiv Niirnberg, Rep. 54, 
Nr. 18, f .  18r; Rep. 54a, I 111 ,  157, and 187. Similar lists can also be drawn up for the butchers 
Hermann Sixt, Fricz Kugler, Hans and Erhard Schaller, and Cuntz Kraws. 
42 G .  Jaritz, ‘Die spatmittelalterliche Stadt in der Sachkulturforschung’, in G .  Wiegelmann 
(ed.), Geschichte der Alltagskultur (Munich, 1980), pp. 53-68, here p. 62. On cheating in the 
crafts, see also id., ‘Handwerkliche Produktion und Qualitat im Spatmittelalter’, in Handwerk 
und Sachkultur im Spatmittelalter (Vienna, 1988). pp. 33-50. 
43 Quoted from Jaritz, ‘Produktion’, p. 34. 
44 C. L. Sachs, ‘Metzgergewerbe und Fleischversorgung bis zum Ende des 30 jahrigen Kriegs’, 
MVGN 24 (1922), 1-260, here p. 252. 
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as no more than either an ‘unscrupulous search for business’ or the criminal 
energy of certain individuals in the late Middle Ages?45 
In his Spruch uom eelichen Stand, written in 1500, the Nuremberg 
Meistersinger Kunz Has referred to those who ridiculed and cheated the 
devout poor (‘und kunnen felschen alle warlauch mit falschem gewicht und 
waglsecht, Got sendet urn uil plug’).& As Has indicated, most of the forms 
of cheating recorded in the punishment register were clearly directed ‘below7- 
that is, against consumers who purchased small quantities on the market. This 
was particularly true of the widespread cheating with scales, and with the 
practice of holding meat back for bulk buyers. In a Ratsuerlass of June 1481, 
the market guard was empowered to bring this reserved meat out of the 
butchers’ chests and sell it on his own init iati~e.~’ On several occasions there 
was also a ban on Zuwaage, meaning the practice of selling cheap meat only 
to those who bought the same amount of a more expensive cut as well. The 
council finally approved this practice in a Verlass of 1498, but on condition 
that customers who bought less than two pounds of cheap meat were not to 
be forced to buy more goods. This was apparently an attempt to protect poor 
 consumer^.^^ Accordingly, the bailiff collected fines not only for the keeping 
back of meat (as in 1482 from Hermann Sixt and in 1484 from Ulrich Kawrhain 
and several of his colleagues), but also for the coercion of customers into 
buying.49 
The bailiffs accounts indicate, in particular, one further lucrative practice 
in the Nuremberg retail trade in foodstuffs. From the beginning of the 1480s’ 
fines appear with increasing frequency for ‘oerpoten rniinz ha&’-that is, for 
accepting or possessing silver money from outside, the circulation of which 
was forbidden in the city. On 17 December 1482, for example, he listed the 
names of twenty-five butchers all of whom had to pay a fine of 120 d for having 
forbidden ‘foreign’ money. In March 1487 he noted that he had collected 
120 d ‘miinz halb’ from the baker Ulrich; in October 1490 the foodstuffs dealer 
Heintz Haynshaymer was forced to pay 120d for forbidden coins, and in 
November 1492 the baker Jorg Herttel was similarly fined. On the occasions 
when the bailiffs accounts give the trades of those who were fined for accepting 
and possessing foreign coins (unfortunately only about half), they were almost 
all in the foodstuffs trade. The vast majority were butchers, bakers, and 
other retailers of  foodstuff^.^^ According to contemporary complaints it was 
precisely these pfenwerthundler, selling their goods for very small amounts of 
money-butchers, bakers, innkeepers, and shopkeepers-who collected the 
45 Ibid. 1618 and 101-6. 
46 Printed in E. Matthias, ‘Der Niirnberger Meistersanger Kunz Has’, MVGN 7 (1888), 16% 
4’ Sachs, ‘Metzgergewerbe’, pp. 30, 68. 
49 Ibid. Rep. 54a, I l l 1  (1482); I187 (1484). 
236, here p. 201. 
Ibid. 209; see also Staatsarchiv Niirnberg, Rep. 52b, Nr. 231, f .  181r. 
Ibid.: 1 1 1 1  (1482), I381 (1490). I471 (1492). 
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most unreliable money. The Verliisse of the Nuremberg authorities are clear 
on this point: on 5 May 1492 the bailiff was ordered to warn against bad 
foreign coins and to control the bakers and shopkeepers because of their use 
of Pfennige from outside; in October of the same year the shopkeepers, 
butchers, and brewers were warned by the council not to accept forbidden 
silver money, or else risk severe p u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~  In a poem written in 1490 and 
printed in 1500, the Nuremberg Meistersinger Kunz Has complained that all 
the shopkeepers had become coiners. He accused them of various techniques 
of manipulating the coinage-f liquating, cutting, and melting down the good 
coins and, especially, of fraudulently exchanging the bad.52 
Is there a connection between the frequent punishment of the foodstuffs 
trade for exceeding the maximum prices and the overwhelming predominance 
of its members among those punished for miinz hulb and the circulation of 
invalid or foreign coins? Apparently it was common practice to demand higher 
prices for payment in invalid or foreign coins-a highly profitable business if 
the butcher could return this forbidden money to circulation at a better rate. 
These forms of exchange were by no means unusual.53 In February 1482, the 
butchers Haintz Kraws and Steffan Slawrspach were each fined 300d for 
requiring their customers to pay in the desirable gold currency of Gulden; 
these, unlike the ‘black’ municipal Pfennige, were not subject to a continuous 
fall in value or constantly mixed with suspect foreign money of doubtful 
value .54 
In dealing with all these offences, punishments in Nuremberg contained no 
notion of recidivism. Despite infringements following one another in quick 
succession, the punishments remained unchanged as fixed in the craft regu- 
lations (Hundwerksordnungen). But what was the aim of these punishments? 
The Nuremberg craft regulations were very strict for political reasons, in order 
to prevent any kind of artisan self-organization and ziinfttisch wesen. For that 
reason, the crafts were not themselves permitted to administer the laws 
affecting them. The regulations of the Nuremberg butchers, for example, 
were anxiously guarded by the council: they were used mainly for the annual 
swearing-in of the masters and were otherwise accessible only to the municipal 
officials. Even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, printing occurred 
only in exceptional cases: the regulations appear to have circulated mainly by 
word of mouth.55 
5’ See Eichhorn, Slrukfurwandel, p. 300; Scholler, Munzwesen, p.49; RB 5 ,  f. 241v and 249r 
(1492). 
Matthias, Has,  p. 196. On usage and the rates of exchange of invalid coins, see in detail 
Groebner, Okonomie. 
53 The rates of exchange for foreign money prescribed in the city Munzrnandaten of 1498 and 
1500 applied only to sums of up to 120 d .  Where higher sums were concerned the rate could be 
negotiated freely with the changer. See Scholler, Munzwesen, p. 49. 
54 Staatsarchiv Nurnberg, Rep. 54a, I 1 1 1 .  See also Dirlmeier, Unfersuchungen, p. 222. 
55 Sachs, ‘Metzgergewerbe’. p. 22. On craft policy in the Imperial Towns see also H.  Lenze, 
‘Nurnberger Gewerbefassung im Mittelalter,’ Jahrbuchfurfrunkische Landesforschung 24 (1964), 
207-82. 
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Our picture of economic practice is therefore inevitably distorted by two 
important facts: on the one hand, we have more access to the text of these 
normative regulations, such as the craft regulations of the butchers, than the 
master butchers of the fifteenth century had themselves; about their practical 
application and interpretation, on the other hand, we-unlike the butcher- 
know only what we can learn from the fragmentary and sometimes con- 
tradictory evidence of the punishment registers and Ratsuerliissen. The pro- 
tocols of the meetings of the Nuremberg council mention sanctions for 
exceeding the maximum prices much less frequently than their repeated 
appearances in the punishment registers would suggest was necessary. In 1481 
the council decided to sentence the butcher Hans Schaller to four weeks 
imprisonment in a barred chamber because he had not only exceeded the 
recommended prices but had also used ‘scheltwort’ (invectives) against munici- 
pal officials. In the previous year another butcher had been banished from 
the town for two years for calling the sworn masters and the leaders of 
the council perjurors and attacking them with ‘uil unczymlich wortten und 
j i i i ~ h e n ’ . ~ ~  In both cases it was apparently the ‘scheltwort’ and abuse of its 
officials, rather than the violations of the price and craft regulations, which 
were punished so harshly by the council. By contrast, the frequent fines for 
false weights and exceeding the maximum prices were not so much punishments 
in our sense of the term as scales of charges. Their main aim did not appear 
to be the remedying of an undesirable situation, but the provision of a financial 
yield for the municipal officials. 
Every year at Fasnacht, the bailiff, the senior official involved in supervising 
the crafts, invited the sworn master butchers for refreshments with wine and 
doughnuts. In his annual account for 1502 this reads: ‘Item an der Fasnacht 
so haben die geschworn meister der fleischhacker nach alter gewohnheit die 
krapfen geholt haben sie mich kost wie hernach schriben stett 11 ib 20d’ (350 d ) .  
On Invocation Sunday, the first in Lent, he had hosted a dinner for the sworn 
master butchers: in 1502 he spent a total of 1,125 d on soup, roast and jellied 
fish, boiled carp, wine, fruit, almonds, and thirty measures of wine (some 32 
What sort of meal was this? The city officials entrusted with the 
supervision of the foodstuffs trade received only small quarterly salaria as 
their fixed pay from the city. Otherwise their income consisted of the fines 
and charges they levied, a part of which they were entitled to keep. Only half 
the amount taken in fines by the bailiff, for example, went to the city treasury; 
the other half he kept as his pay, thus receiving a considerable part of his 
income from the fines imposed on the foodstuffs trade. On the same Invocation 
Sunday in 1502 when he entertained the butchers with wine, soup, and fish, 
he had taken no less than 1,100 d in fines because of the rug of the butcher- 
% RV 136, f .  7v; RB 3, f .  40r. ’’ Staatsarchiv Nurnberg, Rep. 54a, 1766,  f .  9v. 
Towards an Economic History of Customary Practice 133 
sending half to the city treasury and keeping the rest himself.” According to 
the bailiff‘s account for 1507-8, the cost of entertaining the sworn master 
butchers had risen to 1,485 d. 
There were also similarly expensive gifts of food to the sworn master bakers, 
half of whose fines the bailiff also pocketed. He was their host on the Monday 
after Reminiscere (the second Sunday in Lent), when he spent 750 d o n  almond 
soup, pike, carp, roast fish, fifteen measures of wine, and gingerbread.59 The 
bailiff, of course, did not pay for all this food himself: it was provided at the 
expense of the city. Otherwise it would not have appeared in his accounts, 
which detailed the city’s finances and not his own income and expenditure 
(although this would have been at least as interesting). This was not a case of 
‘corruption’, then, but related to mutual ties which such functions served to 
make visible. The Nuremberg regulation of bread and meat prices, and the 
treatment of those who exceeded them, is best described as a system of charges 
imposed by the city; the regular symbolic repayments made to the masters by 
the officials who imposed the charges was part of the system. In fact, the 
expression ‘repayment’ is probably not quite accurate. These meals, at which 
mutual ties were recognized, should be seen not as repayment or compensation 
but as a form of social hinge. Their role was to bind together the payers and 
the recipients of the charges and to confirm and strengthen their relationship. 
It was, moreover, a business relationship at the expense of the municipal 
consumer. 
IV 
Our description of the market in foodstuffs and the reality of prices in a late 
medieval city has taken in the fluctuations in grain prices, bread weights, 
cheating, punishment practices, and scales of charges. In other words, it has 
taken us from the economic context to a consideration of the laws and norms 
which supposedly regulated the market in foodstuffs. At  this point it is 
necessary to make some observations about the way in which historians deal 
with these norms and their violation. In view of the ever-present nature and 
sheer extent of deception and cheating, it is unhelpful to refer simply to 
deviance or dysfunctionality in these segments of the municipal economy. 
Such terms are, at the very least, problematic when used to describe pre- 
industrial societies about whose ‘functioning’ we know so little. In a recent 
article on the traditional Indian bazaar, Frank Fanselow has revealed that the 
watering down and adulteration of goods-especially of basic foodstuffs which 
are bought in small quantities-is part of a specific internal economy. Between 
the individual sellers within the bazaar there is no sales promotion and very 
little actual competition. There is extensive uniformity of prices, with the dry 
’” Ibid., f .  lor; on the charges see f .  8v. The amount taken by the bailiff here was equivalent 
to 55 days’ wages for a farm labourer in the pay of the Heilig-Ceisr-Spiral or 25 days’ wages for 
a worker in the city. 
59 Ibid. 1955, ff. 9v and lor. 
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measure of rice costing the same amount throughout the bazaar, but no ‘brand 
loyalty’. This means that the seller makes his profits by manipulating the 
goods (diluting them with inferior and cheaper substances) and manipulating 
the weights and measures used in making sales. The system of the bazaar 
economy consists of goods of different quality being offered at the same 
price-which the customer must recognize-and in the prevention of lasting 
ties or loyalty between buyer and seller. For that reason sales between traders, 
moving goods among themselves, also play an important role. Fanselow 
deliberately avoids using the word ‘cheating’ in his analysis because, as he 
says, both customers and traders are well aware of how the system works and 
how profits are made.@’ Of course we cannot say that twentieth-century Asian 
bazaars function in the same way as fifteenth-century markets in Nuremberg. 
However, a glance ‘over the borders’ does serve to reveal the extent to which 
‘cheating’, or the manipulation of goods and weights, can be a generally 
recognized element in business practice and an integral (if not explicitly 
accepted) part of an economic system. 
Price ranges and comparisons between grain price and money remain an 
indispensable instrument in any attempt to investigate the purchasing power 
of wages and the living conditions of late medieval town-dwellers. When we 
use these instruments, however, we must be aware that the data which 
underpin them have been obtained by the historian, selected as ‘relevant’ 
from the complex realities of conditions in the market, and then given a 
statistical gloss. Such selection can indeed be representative and highly useful 
but, as I have attempted to demonstrate, it must not be confused with the 
actual conditions of exchange obtaining in the foodstuffs market or with the 
social realities facing the lower classes in the late Middle Ages. Extreme short- 
term fluctuations in foodstuffs’ prices and widespread cheating, like the 
frequent references to additional earnings for artisans and day-labourers and 
forbidden wage supplements in the form of food, cannot be dismissed as 
mere ‘margins of uncertainty’ or factors tending to disturb wage and price 
calculations. They are no less ‘relevant’ simply because they are not precisely 
quantifiable and stand in the way of the historian’s desire for reliable (numeri- 
cal) data. If the researcher fails to consider them or, worse, attempts to give 
them a retrospective statistical gloss in order to ‘get them in order’, he or she 
loses sight of a whole series of important factors which helped to shape life 
in the late medieval towns. It therefore seems necessary to supplement the 
customary approach of economic history. An attempt should be made not 
only to deal with the quantifiable ‘regular’ features of food prices and wage 
labour, but also to investigate the ‘troublesome’ and ‘irregular’ factors which 
affected prices and wages. 
@ F. Fanselow, ‘The Bazaar Economy: Or how bizarre is the bazaar really?’, Man 25 (June 
1990), 250-65. 
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In such a detailed analysis in Nuremberg at the end of the fifteenth century, 
for example, money no longer appears simply as money, but begins to split 
into different sorts carrying different social connotations and elastic rates of 
exchange. Alongside money in coin there were other economic media. In late 
medieval societies marked by recurrent crises of devaluation and money 
shortage, these Wurengelder or Suchgelder, about whose ways of functioning 
we still know very little, seemed to take over at least some of the functions 
of money. The arithmetical unit of ‘money’ was in fact a many-layered and 
fractured and turbulent social reality. The food-purchasing power of these 
kinds of money-in our case the weight and quality of bread which could be 
obtained for one Pfennig between 1470 and 1510-was also subject to enor- 
mous fluctuations. A flexible and accommodating adjustment to those urban 
norms which regulated weight, maximum prices, and market controls also 
reflected these constant movements, this oscillation of prices and value 
relations. 
This adjustment and the flexible application of norms must be taken 
seriously if the researcher hopes to do more than simply report ‘performance 
deficits’ and the existence of the great ‘gulf‘ between the text of the laws and 
the sanctions imposed in practice. The criteria normally employed to describe 
the problem (‘weaknesses of early modern statehood’, ‘dysfunctionality’, 
‘corruption’) seem more likely to obscure the phenomena encountered in the 
sources than to contribute to their description and analysis. The gulf between 
the norms in the foodstuffs market and actual practice was not an empty space 
of the kind which appears in the descriptions of historians (especially between 
different kinds of text, rather than simple ‘types of source’). In reality the 
space is far from empty: it was the sphere marked out by potential sellers on 
the market and their controllers, and exploited according to  their own social 
and economic logic: to extend their own room for manoeuvre, for conflicts 
with rivals or institutions on the one hand, for co-operation and the division 
of labour on the other; to minimize their own risks and expenditures; and, of 
course, to maximize their own income and prospects of profit. 
I hope it has become clear that we are dealing here with economic history 
in the literal sense-with the analysis of economic practice. This shows us that 
it can be a mistake to rely on the selection of ‘relevant data’ with which to 
project ourselves back 500 years in order to investigate specific areas (in this 
case the retail trade in foodstuffs), and thus to describe the everyday economic 
life of late medieval town-dwellers. Research into these economic forms must 
go beyond the simple description of the norms, which reveal the authorities’ 
claims to make regulations rather than the extent of regulation and discipline 
actually achieved. Equally, it must also go beyond the infringement of these 
norms, which are always presented in the city sources as a series of individual 
cases and as a matter of personal misconduct. Instead, the aim must be to 
reconstruct the underlying social logic-the egotistic, provisional, day-to-day 
adjustment of value relations between money and money, and money and 
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goods, which appears as the result of mutual trials of strength, negotiations, 
and business relationships. These relations are subject to rapid changes. For 
that reason, such manipulations and tricks can be described as ‘swings’. By 
that I do not mean the up-and-down movement of prices, but the manifold 
techniques encapsulated in the colloquialism ‘we’ll swing it somehow’-taking 
people for a ride, making choices, using the system to best effect. It was these 
socially embedded and competing practices which determined both social and 
economic conflicts and the conditions of survival in the towns of the late 
Middle Ages. It is important to reconstruct them if historians wish to avoid 
the approach of the fifteenth-century authorities themselves, whose laws and 
regulations were a written attempt to regulate and fix municipal reality ‘as it 
was supposed to be’. 
Translated by Louise Willmot 
